Enhancing Global-Local Cooperation in Multi-Disciplinary P/CVE Efforts

Recommendations from Experts’ Roundtable

24 September 2018

1. Whom you engage with at a local level needs to be contextually defined and based on local realities. Too often, P/CVE programs fail to recognize that the different capacities and legitimacy of stakeholders vary within different contexts, which undermines the impact and sustainability of such programs.

2. The sharing of research and other knowledge of what drives violent extremism and what works (and what does not) to prevent/counter it needs to be more accessible and systematically shared.
   - More incentives and mechanisms are needed to encourage greater sharing such as the creation of lessons-learned fora at the national, regional, and international levels, which incentivizes exchanges of not only successes, but, equally importantly, failures.
   - These fora could also be used to map (in a transparent fashion) current and recent P/CVE initiatives in order to mitigate against the duplication of efforts, reduce opportunity costs, and capitalise on available synergies.

3. Create structures at the sub-national level to enable cooperation and build trust among different stakeholders (government and non-governmental) and take seriously community concerns, which might include but not be limited to violent extremism. Trust is the foundation for all P/CVE programs and trust-building should be an ongoing exercise rather than a reactive one. Such structures can play an important role in prevention as well as mitigating against potential community tensions in the wake of an attack.

4. Though P/CVE activities are relevant to security, they should fall in the preventative space. Current reactive approaches to P/CVE in some contexts appear to be ignoring P/CVE in favour of or conflating it with traditional counterterrorism approaches. This risks undermining community trust and being counter-productive in the long run. Preventative or countering activities are complementary to counter terrorism but need to be taken seriously in their own right.

5. Donors should ensure a proportion of their P/CVE budgets requires cross-organizational (and, where appropriate, inter-disciplinary) collaboration and creates opportunities for new entrants to the P/CVE space.

6. Empower, trust, and build the capacity of CSOs and other local actors, including municipalities, to maximize their contributions to P/CVE beyond project

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1 These recommendations emerged during the 24 September roundtable; they do not necessarily reflect the views of all roundtable participants.
implementers. This includes ensuring that the voices of civil society and municipal authorities are heard and taken into account by policymakers throughout the P/CVE policymaking and program development process.

7. The space for civil society is contracting globally. There is a need to preserve the legal and political space for civil society to contribute to the full spectrum of P/CVE, from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration. It is also important to acknowledge that civil society organizations do not represent all of civil society and to ensure that broader civil society is included in P/CVE.

8. National Action Plans (NAPs) can be a useful framework and vehicle for establishing roles and responsibilities in an often complex, multi-stakeholder context. However, maximizing their impact requires first undertaking a genuinely consultative, multi-layered, national dialogue on violent extremism and how to prevent and counter it.

   • The dialogue should include the full range of stakeholders (national and sub-national; law enforcement and non-law enforcement, civil society and government, and, where relevant, donors), be based on a transparent stakeholder mapping and needs and context analyses, which should inform the NAP.

   • The dialogue should be facilitated by an actor with credibility with the government, civil society and other relevant local actors, including sub-national governments.

   • The dialogue should be conscious of existing power structures to mitigate against their reinforcement.

9. NAPs need to be flexible and open to adaptation. They need to allow for sub-national plans that enable local priorities to emerge and subsequently feed back into and inform national level policies and approaches.

10. There should be better alignment between NAPs or other relevant national frameworks and locally-led P/CVE programs to ensure they are mutually reinforcing; dedicated resources should be made available to support locally-designed and led implementation projects linked, where appropriate, to a NAP.